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Abstract 
The national threat perception of a nation is an important guideline for the 
education of its officers, since it defines or anticipates the general military and 
socio-political milieu in which those officers must be prepared to operate.  This 
paper traces the evolution of the threat perception of the South African Department 
of Defence since 1950 and the response of the South African Military Academy in 
terms of its educational programmes.  It highlights the attitude of Defence 
Headquarters towards the Military Academy as a military-academic institution and 
the historical position of the Academy in the course of officer development.  The 
paper also investigates the number and demographic profile of students routed 
through the Military Academy, which is central to these issues.  Today, in the wake 
of the termination of the so-called Bush War on her borders and the liberation 
struggle within her frontiers, there is no clear, direct military threat against South 
Africa.  In the absence of such a threat, the secondary functions of the SANDF, 
particularly regional peacekeeping and peace support operations, seem to occupy 
the centre stage.  The paper therefore concludes with a perspective on the relevance 
of the Military Academy’s current academic offerings to the preparation of SANDF 
officers for their perceived role scenario in the twenty-first century. 
                                                
1. The author is indebted to colleagues Lt Cols Abel Esterhuysen and Ian van der Waag for their 
comments and, in the case of the latter, also for language advice. 
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Introduction 
 Referring to Clemenceau's much-quoted statement that "war is too important 
to be left to generals", Carl W. Reddel points out that, 'for better or for worse' it is 
indeed the generals and admirals, in the final analysis, who 'look after the conduct of 
warfare'.  He therefore concludes that 'the success of their education, training and 
performance is vital for the short- and long-term survival of all nations'.2  If one 
considers that an officer's performance is mostly determined by his/her education 
and training, which imparts the knowledge, skills, values and attitudes essential to 
his/her profession,3 then that aspect is clearly of the utmost importance.  The recent 
US decision to go to war with Iraq was certainly a political one taken by the Bush 
administration, but certainly not without a substantial input from its generals and 
admirals.  Although the rules of engagement for that war were no doubt laid down in 
principle by the US political authorities, the conduct of the war was in the hands of 
the military, not only those of the generals and admirals, but also junior officers and 
even non-commissioned officers and private soldiers.  The performance and conduct 
of these officers and men were not only vital in breaking the ability and will of the 
Iraqi forces to resist, but also in shaping local and global public opinion on the US 
intervention, particularly in their ongoing efforts to establish law and order and 
negotiate the low-intensity conflict in which they became embroiled to pave the way 
for the establishment of a new, credible political dispensation. 
 Given this complex playing field, one can only endorse Reddel's assessment 
that 'public military service… [is] without question the most demanding profession' 
of the twenty-first century and that 'no other professional role incorporates such a 
wide range of decision-making challenges posing profound implications for nations 
and their societies - nationally, regionally, and globally'.4  Military decisions and 
policies today, more than ever before, have the potential for 'ethical, economic, 
social, and political ramifications'5 far beyond the battlefield.  This puts a huge 
premium on professional competence based on sustained intellectual development.  
To this end Col Don J. Snider (US Army, retired) observes: 
 
                                                
2. C.W. Reddel.  1998.  Preface.  In E.V. Converse III (ed).  Forging the Sword:  Selecting, 
Educating, and Training Cadets and Junior Officers in the Modern World (Imprint 
Publications, Chicago), p xii. 
3. E.V. Converse III.  1998.  Introduction.  In E.V. Converse III (ed).  Forging the Sword:  
Selecting, Educating, and Training Cadets and Junior Officers in the Modern World 
(Imprint Publications, Chicago), p 1. 
4. C.W. Reddel, Preface, p xi. 
5. C.W. Reddel, Preface, p xi. 
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The serious obligations of officership – and the enormous consequences of 
professional failure – establish professional competence as a moral 
imperative.  More than knowing one’s job or proficiency in the skills and 
abilities of the military art, professional competence in this sense includes 
worldly wisdom, creativity and confidence.  Called to their profession and 
motivated to master their practice of it, officers are committed to a career 
of study and learning.6 
 Since junior officers of today are the generals of tomorrow, their education is 
tantamount to laying the foundation for future generalship.  Flawed junior officer 
education may well produce flawed generalship in the longer term.  In an effort to 
prepare officers best for their professional role, defence forces have historically 
studied and copied the officer development systems of other nations, resulting in 
many similarities and even a broad common pattern internationally.7  Though 
referring to US army officers specifically, Snider in fact sums up this broad pattern 
when he states that the ‘developmental goals of all commissioned officers should be 
to better understand the… identities of the officer and how they… are integrated into 
individual practice…understanding that they are simultaneously warfigthers, leaders 
of character, members of a profession, and servants of the nation.’8  Besides 
thorough, functional military preparation, this clearly calls for a broad, liberal 
education that will enable officers to view their socio-political environment in 
perspective and conduct themselves accordingly. 
 Yet the circumstances, values and attitudes of nations differ and 
consequently also their needs regarding officer development.  Furthermore, the 
national and international position of nations changes over time, demanding a 
continuous review of their officer training and educational programmes.  Defence 
forces thus have to keep track of international trends on the one hand in order to 
avoid lagging behind, and, on the other hand, they must timeously adapt to their own 
changing needs.  In deciding how to train and educate officers for the complex 
military scenario of the 21st century, the threat perception of a nation is obviously an 
important guideline, since it defines or anticipates the broad military and socio-
political milieu in which officers must be prepared to operate.  The direction taken 
from the threat perception must, of course, be set against the broader, fundamental 
goals of officer education referred to above. 
                                                
6. D. J. Snider.  2003.  Officership: The Professional Practice.  Military Review, January-
February, p 8. 
7. E.V. Converse III, Introduction, pp 1, 361. 
8. D. J. Snider, The Professional Practice, p 8. 
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 The aim of this paper is to determine how the South African Military 
Academy has historically responded to the national threat perception in terms of its 
academic offerings.  The paper traces the evolution of the South African threat 
perception since 1950, as reflected in the White Paper on Defence, and investigates 
the relevance of the Military Academy’s educational programmes to the perceived 
threat perception.  For this purpose the official threat perception is taken at face 
value, without any attempt at analysing its validity.  The paper further explores the 
attitude of Defence Headquarters towards the Military Academy as a military-
academic institution and the historical position of the Academy in the course of 
officer development.  It also investigates the related issue of the number of students 
routed through the Military Academy and the demographic profile of the student 
body.  The paper concludes with a perspective on the relevance of the Military 
Academy’s current academic offerings to the SANDF’s educational needs with a 
view to the contemporary threat perception and South Africa's prospective 
international (regional) role in the 21st century. 
The Military Academy At The Dawning Of The Nuclear Age 
 In the years following immediately after the Second World War South 
Africa's defence policy remained closely intertwined with that of Great Britain.  As a 
member of the Commonwealth the Union accepted co-responsibility for defending 
the gateways of Africa, and in particular the Middle East, which was considered to 
be Africa's first line of defence.  At a national security level South Africa faced no 
real threat from Africa or anywhere else.9  Consequently, when the Military 
Academy was established in Pretoria in 1950, its curricula was aimed generally at 
meeting the military-academic challenges of officer development in the high-tech 
environment of the nuclear age and to place the Union Defence Force on par with 
Western standards.10 
 Broadly following the West Point-model, the focus at the Academy was on 
the Natural Sciences.  At military academies internationally, much emphasis was 
still being placed on Mathematics, which was regarded more suitable than the liberal 
arts in the cultivation of critical thought for the kind of decisions military officers 
would have to take.  Only 25% of the annual intake at the Academy was allowed to 
follow the BA(Mil) course.  The bulk of the cadets had to take the BSc(Mil) course.  
                                                
9. Republic of South Africa.  1971.  Review of Defence and Armaments Production:  Period 
1960 to 1970 (Defence Headquarters, Pretoria), pp 5, 9. 
10. South African National Defence Force Archives (hereafter: SANDFA), CGS (War) 281, 56/36, 
Acting Chief of the General Staff (hereafter: CGS) – Minister of Defence, 22 March 1949; 
SANDFA, SA Mil Col (Gp 1) 164, MC/T/12/1, Cmdt SA Mil Col – Director Policy Co-
ordination, 27 May 1949; SANDFA, AG(3) 222, AG(3)1906/9 Vol 1, Acting Secretary of 
Defence. – Minister of Defence, 5 July 1949. 
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Furthermore, Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry, were compulsory even in the 
BA(Mil) degree.  At the same time, however, a few core subjects directly relevant to 
the military profession, namely Military History, Military Law, Military Geography 
and Military Technology, were also compulsory for both degrees.  The military 
degree courses thus had in common a distinct military-academic foundation.  The 
emphasis on this common professional foundation is born out by the fact that these 
latter subjects were grouped together within the collective discipline 'Military 
Science'.11  This common military-academic base had some grounding in the social 
sciences, which was in line with the notion of a broad, liberal education12 pursued by 
military academies after the Second World War. 
 The international focus on a broad, liberal education was clearly aimed at 
creating an understanding of the complex socio-political milieu within which the 
military operates.  From that perspective, the absence of Political Science as a core 
subject in the BSc(Mil) and BA(Mil) curricula,13 was an obvious hiatus.  More 
serious perhaps, were two other shortcomings.  Firstly, with an annual intake of a 
mere 30 cadets, and furthermore from only the army and air force, not all 
prospective officers were routed through the institution.  Secondly, the Union 
Defence Force and its officers’ corps did not accept ownership of the Military 
Academy.  This might, partially at least, be attributed to the fact that the Academy 
was the brainchild of the new Nationalist Defence Minister, F.C. Erasmus, whose 
political motives were not shared throughout the officers’ corps.  Of greater 
significance, however, was the fact that very few serving officers had enjoyed the 
benefit of a university education and felt threatened by this novel development.  
Furthermore, the lecturing staff at the Academy, though in uniform, was recruited 
from civil society and had very little (if any) credibility in the eyes of the military on 
account of their lack of military training and experience.14  These views and 
attitudes hampered the development of the fledgling Academy and almost caused it 
to be closed down in the mid-1950s.15 
                                                
11. University of Pretoria Archives, Minutes of the Council of the University of Pretoria 1950, 
Minutes of meeting between representatives of the University of Pretoria and the UDF, 26 May 
1950. 
12. H. Thomas. 1961. The Story of Sandhurst (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London), pp 223–31; 
T.J. Crackel. 1991. The Illustrated History of West Point (Harry N. Abrams Inc, New 
York,), pp 225, 239-43; S. Forman. 1950. West Point: A History of the United States 
Military Academy (Columbia University Press, New York), pp 199, 208-13, 219. 
13. SANDFA, AG(3) 222, AG(3)1906/9 Vol I, Military Academy curricula, 21 July 1950. 
14. M. van Niekerk - G.E. Visser, interview, Saldanha, 16 September 1992; C.M. Bakkes – G.E. 
Visser, interview, Pretoria, 29 July 1993; E.L. Bekker – G.E. Visser, interview, Saldanha, 24 
March 1999. 
15. SANDFA, CG C43 D81, CGS/GPT/1/3/1/1 Vol 3, CGS – Minister of Defence, 29 May 1954. 
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 Though the Academy's response to the threat perception in the early 1950s 
was thus reasonably satisfactory in terms of its educational programmes, it was 
flawed in terms of the number of officers it delivered and the value that the military 
attached to its academic offerings. 
The Former South African Goverment's Perception Of The Cold War And The 
Liberation Struggle 
 South Africa's threat perception changed dramatically at the beginning of the 
1960s.  To demonstrate their departure from colonialism the Western powers had 
withdrawn from the African continent with great speed after World War II.  The 
Union perceived this exodus as paving the way for communist expansion in Africa, 
which presented an indirect onslaught on Western capitalism to achieve the (former) 
Soviet Union's aim of world domination and international communism.  In its threat 
perception the Apartheid government thus stressed the prevailing Western view that 
the Soviet Union, in pursuance of its aim of world domination, was supporting and 
exploiting dissatisfaction, insurrection and liberation struggles across the globe to 
expand its influence, gain footholds and strangle the Western powers.16  It therefore 
portrayed both the internal liberation struggle, spearheaded by the African National 
Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and the hostility of the 
newly independent or self-governing African states towards South Africa as local 
manifestations of the global communist onslaught against the West.17  This 
perception was strengthened when the ANC and the PAC, banned by the Verwoerd-
government, formed military wings (Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and Poqo, later 
succeeded by the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA)), and forged ties with 
the Soviet Union and Red China respectively to obtain support for an armed struggle 
against the governing powers.18 
 Having established bases outside the borders of the Republic of South 
Africa, MK and Poqo embarked upon a campaign of low-intensity armed resistance 
against the Apartheid state in the early 1960s.19  By the late 1960s an externally 
based unconventional guerrilla onslaught against the state was also materialising.  In 
                                                
16. Republic of South Africa, Review of Defence and Armaments Production:  Period 1960 to 
1970, pp 5, 9; Republic of South Africa.  1975.  White Paper on Defence and Armament 
Production, 1975, p 7; Republic of South Africa.  1982.  White Paper on Defence and 
Armaments Supply, 1982, p 1. 
17. Republic of South Africa, Review of Defence and Armaments Production:  Period 1960 to 
1970, pp 5, 9. 
18. T.R.H. Davenport:  1991.  South Africa:  A Modern History, 4th ed (MacMillan:  
Basingstoke and London), pp 356-58, 363-67, 388; Republic of South Africa.  1973.  White 
Paper on Defence and Armament Production, 1973, pp 1-5; Republic of South Africa, 
White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1982, p 1. 
19. T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa:  A Modern History, pp 364-67, 388. 
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the words of the White Paper on Defence 'terrorists [were] active in Angola, 
Moçambique and along the Rhodesian border' and their 'training, organisation and 
armament [were] improving appreciably’.20  During 1966/1967 a number of 
guerrillas from the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), resisting 
South African rule in South West Africa (SWA)/Namibia, infiltrated that territory 
and clashed with the South African Police in the Caprivi Strip.21  The early 1970s 
saw a significant increase in guerrilla activities on the (SWA)/Namibia border and 
the South African Defence Force (SADF) stepped in to assume responsibility for 
counterinsurgency operations in that territory.22  The sudden collapse of the 
neighbouring Portuguese buffer states, Angola and Mozambique, in 1974/75, and 
Rhodesia in 1979 increased the pressure on the borders of South Africa and 
SWA/Namibia significantly, since it offered the liberation movements bases on 
South Africa's doorstep from where they could infiltrated the country23 'for the 
purposes of terrorism, sabotage and subversion with a view to overthrowing the 
existing order.'24 
 In his introduction to the 1973 White Paper on Defence, the Minister of 
Defence, P.W. Botha, stressed South Africa's willy-nilly involvement in the global 
power struggle, stating: 
The RSA is part of the modern world, and as such, involuntarily involved 
in the prevailing international struggle for power.  Furthermore, as a result 
of the relative check-mate… between the super powers in the sphere of 
nuclear weapons, we find ourselves in a position of increasing strategic 
importance in that struggle.  Like the rest of the Free World, the RSA is a 
target for international communism and its cohorts - leftist activists, 
exaggerated humanism, permissiveness, materialism and related 
ideologies.  The RSA has been singled out as a special target for the by-
products of their ideologies, such as black racialism, exaggerated 
individual freedom, one-man-one-vote, and a host of other slogans...  
Geographically the RSA is a part of the Third World: in the military and 
                                                
20. Republic of South Africa, Review of Defence and Armaments Production:  Period 1960 to 
1970, p 26. 
21. Republic of South Africa.  1969.  White Paper on Defence and Armament Production, 
1969, p 5; T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa:  A Modern History, p 388. 
22. Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Defence and Armament Production, 1973, pp 1-
5; Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Defence and Armament Production, 1975, pp 
4-7; T.R.H. Davenport,  South Africa:  A Modern History, pp 456, 459, 473-74. 
23. Republic of South Africa,  White Paper on Defence and Armament Production, 1975, p 7; 
Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1982, pp 2-3. 
24. Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Defence and Armament Production, 1975, p 7. 
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cultural spheres it is a captive ally of the West, and ideologically a direct 
obstacle in the path of communism.25 
 In terms of the internal black liberation struggle Botha warned that South 
Africa faced ‘an acknowledged concept in communist strategic options’, namely a 
‘protracted war of low intensity in which the enemy retains the initiative, keeps the 
target country in constant suspense and tries to break it by undermining and sapping 
its resistance’.  A ‘basic strategy’ in this process was ‘promoting insurgency from 
neighbouring countries’.26  The Soviet Union, in view of the South African 
strategists, deliberately pinned the SADF down in a protracted 'terrorist war' on the 
SWA/Namibian border to promote and support 'terrorist activities' within South 
Africa.27 
 This threat perception, in the mid-1970s, ushered in the era of 'total 
onslaught' and 'total strategy' in South Africa's strategic thinking, which was not 
really a new concept, since the 1969 White Paper on Defence and Armament 
Production already stated that 'the unconventional method of warfare can entail the 
involvement of an entire country in such a conflict'.28  In the 1973 White Paper 
Botha emphasized that it was of vital importance for South Africa to closely co-
ordinate and integrate ‘internal policy, foreign policy and defence policy… in the 
present international climate which is typified by total strategy… our defence is not 
a matter for the Defence Force only, but also for each department and citizen.’29 
 The 1975 White Paper took the idea of 'total onslaught' and 'total strategy' 
further.  It stressed the 'intensifying hostile actions by anti-movements and extremist 
ideological elements' and stated: 
The fact that the moving forces behind this enmity - wittingly or 
unwittingly - virtually always derives from ideological objectives or 
inspirations, and that the leaders are extremists, involves the danger of 
desperate actions.  The ideological and extremist psychology rejects 
evolution and reform and views any progress in this respect as a threat to 
its cherished goal of revolution.  We can therefore expect from these 
                                                
25. P.W. Botha.  1973.  Preface.  In Republic of South Africa.  White Paper on Defence and 
Armament Production, 1973, p 1. 
26. P.W. Botha.  1973.  Preface.  In Republic of South Africa.  White Paper on Defence and 
Armament Production, 1973, p 2. 
27. Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1982, p 1. 
28. Republic of South Africa,  White Paper on Defence and Armament Production, 1969, p 5. 
29. P.W. Botha.  1973.  Preface.  In Republic of South Africa.  White Paper on Defence and 
Armament Production, 1973, p 1. 
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sources ever more intense and more acrimonious attacks in every 
conceivable field - from sport to force of arms.30 
 From this perspective it was not Government policy 'to base our national 
defence on military capabilities alone (or even primarily)… [and] military means 
(consequently) do not play the major role in our total defence policy.31  The 1977 
White Paper stated that South Africa was faced with a total, multidimensional 
onslaught on the military, psychological, economical, political, sociological, 
technological, diplomatic, ideological, cultural, religious and other fronts.  
Government thus had to formulate a total national strategy involving all government 
departments and utilising all national resources - including the private sector and 
every citizen, black and white - on an integrated basis to counter the onslaught on 
every front.32 
 The simmering internal dissatisfaction erupted abruptly in a student uprising 
in Soweto in June 1976, firstly against inferior black education, but generally as a 
result of a broad spectrum of socio-political and economic grievances.  The unrest 
spread rapidly throughout the country and sparked off a sustained situation of unrest 
and violence that continued until 1980.  Jerked into action by the student uprisings, 
the ANC and PAC revitalised their armed struggle, gaining many recruits as a result 
of the momentum created by the student uprisings.33 
 The Soviet Union, according to South Africa’s threat perception, gave 
increasing military support to Angola and Mozambique to ensure their continued 
support of 'terrorism' in SWA/Namibia and South Africa.  In addition to the 
perpetuated presence of Cubans, Soviet and East German military personnel now 
became more and more involved in direct support of Angola and Mozambique's 
armed forces and the training of SWAPO and ANC guerrillas.  At the same time the 
Soviet Union supplied these countries generously with weapons, including tanks and 
aircraft.  The air space of these two countries also became increasingly inaccessible 
to the SA Air Force as the Soviet Union systematically improved their air defence 
systems, supplying advanced ground-to-air missiles and supporting radar systems.34  
The latter was, of course, almost a mirror image of the situation in the Middle East 
                                                
30. Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Defence and Armament Production, 1975, p 5. 
31. Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Defence and Armament Production, 1975, p 4. 
32. Republic of South Africa.  1977.  White Paper on Defence, 1977, pp 4-5. 
33. T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa:  A Modern History, pp 388-93. 
34. Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1982, p 2; 
Republic of South Africa.  1986.  White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1986, p 
12. 
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during the 1970s when the Soviet Union put a virtually impenetrable air defence 
system over Egypt’s border with Israel.35 
 By the mid-1980s, SADF estimates placed 'approximately 40 000 troops 
from surrogate countries' in Angola, with ten to fifteen Soviet officers 'attached as 
command elements'.36  The influx of sophisticated military equipment, especially 
into Angola, continued unabated, escalating the conventional threat significantly.  
South Africa in fact became involved in large-scale conventional operations against 
Soviet-led forces in Angola in the 1980s in support of Unita.  At the same time the 
Soviet Union intensified its multi-dimensional 'total onslaught' against South 
Africa's political, economic, social, security and psychological power base through 
the Third World, the UN, the OAU, the World Council of Churches and other 
international organisations.  These organisations were also used to exert pressure on 
South Africa to refrain from cross-border strikes against guerrilla bases in 
neighbouring countries, a method often used by South Africa to pre-empt and 
disrupt its enemies.  The OAU became 'one of the most important forums by means 
of which the activities of the African states… [were] co-ordinated and directed… 
[and] a channel for providing funds for the revolutionary onslaught'37 against the 
RSA.  Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique were especially 'increasingly 
prepared to allow the ANC… to commit deeds of terror in the RSA through, and 
from, their territories'.38 
 A new wave of internal unrest, violence, civil disobedience and consumer 
boycotts, supported by 'terrorist activities' from across its borders, hit South Africa 
in September 1984, with a view to making the country 'ungovernable' and the 
politico-constitutional reforms of the Apartheid government 'unworkable'.  
Consequently, the SA Army was deployed in support of the South African Police 
from October 1984 to curb the unrest.  This new cycle of unrest was accompanied 
by extensive international media campaigns to discredit the South African 
Government and create the perception that government had lost control of the 
internal situation.  From 1984 to 1986 foreign radio propaganda against South 
Africa, especially conducted from Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Tanzania, 
Mozambique, Lesotho, Nigeria, the Soviet Union and Germany, but also from the 
USA, Great Britain, France and the Netherlands, rose by 50%.39 
 
                                                
35. Herzog, C. 1985.  The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the 
War of Independence to Lebanon, 2nd ed. ( Steimatsky, Tel Aviv), pp  227, 307-308. 
36. Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1986, p 12. 
37. Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1986, p 12. 
38. Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1986, p 12. 
39. Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1986, pp 13-5. 
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The Military Academy's Response To The Revolutionary Onslaught 
 The threat perception that emerged from 1960 onwards, both externally and 
internally, clearly required the Military Academy to equip young officers with a 
broad understanding of warfare, especially revolutionary and counterrevolutionary 
warfare, within the context (both technologically and socio-politically) of the Cold 
War.  But the Academy, relocated to Saldanha during the mid-50s where it became a 
combined services Academy under the auspices of the University of Stellenbosch, 
failed to meet this requirement.  The new academic dispensation made provision for 
three BMil degree courses, namely Human, Natural and Commercial Sciences.  The 
BMil course in the Natural Sciences offered only one (partially) 'human sciences' 
subject, namely Geography.  The BMil course in the Human Sciences included three 
'natural sciences' subjects, namely Special Mathematics, Aeronautical Science and 
Nautical Science ('Sea Navigation').  Political Science and Public Administration 
were (though not from the start) included as compulsory subjects in the BMil in 
Commercial Sciences.  Military History, widely regarded as the cornerstone of 
military education, was a compulsory subject in the BMil in the Human Sciences 
only.40 
 With Military History absent from the BMil courses in both the Natural 
Sciences and the Commercial Sciences, and Political Science not offered in the BMil 
course in the Natural Sciences, the degree courses of the Military Academy had lost 
the common professional base it had in Pretoria.  Not all cadets were thus prepared 
for the socio-political milieu in which they were to operate, a significant failure with 
a view to the nature of counterrevolutionary warfare.  The Dean and Commanding 
Officer of the Military Academy, Col PJ.G. de Vos, spotted the gap and pointed out 
that this was contrary to the practice abroad.  He made a strong plea for the inclusion 
of Political Science in the curricula for the BMil in the Natural Sciences and, in 
addition, appealed to Defence Headquarters to introduce Ethnology as a subject at 
the Military Academy.  Both recommendations were rejected,41 indicating that 
Defence Headquarters had not yet bought the necessity of a broad, liberal education 
for all officers, nor realised the crucial role the Academy could play in equipping 
officers with a broad frame of reference to address the intellectual challenges 
associated with the threat perception. 
                                                
40. D. [G.E.] Visser:  2002.  Marrying Sparta and Athens:  The South African Military Academy 
and task-orientated junior officer development in peace and war.  Journal for Contemporary 
History, Vol 27, No 3, December, pp 190-91. 
41. G.E. Visser.  2000.  Die Geskiedenis van die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Akademie, 1950 - 1990 
[The History of the South African Military Academy, 1950 – 1990] (Doctoral dissertation 
published as Supplementa ad Scientia Militaria I), pp 271-73. 
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 In 1967, the Chief of the South African Defence Force, Gen. R.C. Hiemstra, 
complained that there was 'too much emphasis… on academic education, with the 
result that the Academy-product… [was] not equal to his task as young officer, 
especially with regard to the practical demands of leadership and task performance 
at the lowest level”.42  This sparked off two extensive investigations into the role and 
function of the Military Academy in 1967 (Hartzenberg Committee43) and 1968 
(Malan Committee44).  The Hartzenberg and Malan investigations, which studied the 
training and educational systems of various military institutions abroad, emphasised 
that an officer should be an intelligent, well-balanced, educated, patriotic and 
religious person of high integrity and moral values, able to fulfil leadership roles 
both as a military professional and in civil society.  His training and education 
should be aimed at his deployment both as officer and citizen, at equipping him 
professionally for modern warfare, including low-intensity revolutionary and 
counterrevolutionary warfare, and at enabling him to understand society and his role 
in it.45  Both the international principles of junior officer education and the national 
threat perception thus confirmed the need for a broad, liberal education, based in the 
social sciences, for all officers. 
 In view of these findings, Professor G. van N. Viljoen, Rector of the Rand 
Afrikaans University, was consulted on the future composition of the BMil 
curricula.  He stressed that the BMil curricula should have a common professional 
base, which, in his view had to be ‘Military Science’.  This he defined broadly as 'a 
continuous, scientifically based and well co-ordinated study of the entire military 
situation'46.  His plea was thus clearly for a number of compulsory core subjects, 
based in both the social and the natural sciences.  Any BMil curriculum without such 
a common 'scientific pillar' would fail to achieve the desired results of officer 
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education, namely to enable officers to think critically and independently about their 
profession and apply their knowledge effectively in any given situation.47 
 The recommendations of the Hartzenberg and Malan Committees led to the 
introduction of a new training and education system at the Military Academy in 
1970, based on a threefold concept of formative officer development comprising 
general, scientific and military education.48  The military authorities took heed of 
Prof Viljoen's plea for a core curriculum and made Military History and Political 
Science compulsory for all students at first-year level, regardless of their direction of 
study.  The rest of their subjects depended on the student's study direction, the need 
of his service or corps and his personal choice.49  The Hartzenberg Committee 
recommended the inclusion of Ethnology and Psychology in the BMil curricula,50 
while the Malan Committee wanted to add Sociology.51  All these subjects were 
extremely relevant and useful in equipping young officers for counterrevolutionary 
warfare, inter alia in the 'winning of hearts and minds' programmes.  In the end 
Defence Headquarters included none of these subjects in the new curricula, probably 
because of the cost implications, and thus failed to empower the Academy to realise 
its full potential in preparing young officers for the perceived threat perception.  
However, with Military History and Political Science as compulsory subjects in all 
study directions, the BMil had once again at least some common base that orientated 
prospective officers in the socio-political milieu in which they would be expected to 
operate.  Furthermore, all prospective officers of the SADF henceforth spent at least 
six months at the Academy if they could or would not follow the entire degree 
course.52 
 The escalation, from 1976, of the South African Defence Force’s 
involvement in the so-called “Bush War” on the borders of South West 
Africa/Namibia had a profound negative influence on officer education at the 
Military Academy.  To satisfy the increasing demand for junior officers, Defence 
Headquarters decided that candidate officers should be “task qualified” within their 
respective service and undergo some in-service training, before receiving their 
commissions or becoming eligible for admission to the Military Academy.  From 
1976 the responsibility for formative training was thus retransferred to the arms of 
service.  But, more significantly, the Military Academy was taken out of the loop of 
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officer development completely, since the degree course no longer formed part of 
the preparation of candidate officers for commissioning.53  Operational realities, 
specifically the shortage of human resources, thus caused the Defence Force to 
abandon tertiary military-academic education as an important component of 
preparing junior officers for the perceived threat perception and to rely on 
functional, ‘task-orientated’ training alone. 
 As a result of these developments tertiary education at the Military Academy 
became an optional extra for those who wished to embark upon that route.  Instead 
of preparing candidate officers for commissioned appointment, the Academy now 
became a de facto military university offering university education to commissioned 
officers, some already holding the rank of major.54  At the height of the former 
South African government’s counterinsurgency war most young officers were 
consequently thrown into the operational environment before they had the benefit of 
an academic education to prepare them for that environment at an intellectual level.  
Furthermore, those who did end up at the Academy, once more studied diverging 
BMil degree courses without any common, professional base (core curriculum), 
since Military History and Political Science were no longer compulsory subjects.55  
In general the academic offerings of the Military Academy were therefore neither 
relevant to the threat perception, nor conducive of a broad, liberal education as 
fundamental principle of junior officer development. 
 What Lieutenant General R.J. Evraire of the Canadian Forces observed with 
regard to his country’s military in 1988, was now also true about the South African 
Defence Force: ‘higher education was not conceived… as a way to develop the 
minds of officers; rather it was a task-oriented function to acquire a skill for which 
there was an obvious and immediate need for a few, mostly in technical areas.56  
Adapting to this scenario, the Military Academy worked at making its academic 
offerings relevant to task-orientated officer development.  Through a process of 
extensive consultation with the services the Academy brought its curricula and 
course contents once more into alignment with the articulated needs of the Defence 
Force, introducing new subjects, such as Business Psychology (Mil) (later Industrial 
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Psychology (Mil)) and Computer Information Systems (Mil) in the 1980s to meet 
previously uncatered for needs.57 
 Besides the lack of an appropriate core curriculum, the number of officers 
passing through the Academy also impacted negatively on the institution’s relevance 
to the threat perception.  On the one hand cost factors prohibited a significant 
increase in the Academy’s student body, and on the other Defence Headquarters 
were never quite clear about the percentage of the officers’ corps that had to obtain 
the BMil degree.  The Malan Committee (1968) indicated a total of 30% for the 
army and 20% each for the air force and the navy.  These figures were raised in 
1976 to a desired minimum of 25% of the total officers’ corps, which implied an 
annual intake of 106 students.  Thereafter the intention seems to have been to route 
as many officers as operational requirements, the budget and available facilities 
allowed, through the Academy, without setting a specific percentage.  The desired 
annual intake was raised to 175 in 1982, and in May 1985, Defence Headquarters 
decided to increase the total student body to 235 by 1990 and 325 by 1995.  
However, none of these enrolment targets were ever realised in practice.  The 
average annual intake only rose from 45 in 1961 to approximately 68 by 1985, 
resulting in a total undergraduate student body of about 200 per year.  By 1990 the 
average, annual first-year enrolment had climbed only to 89, still way off the official 
target of 235 per year.  This perpetuated under-enrolment resulted from a chronic 
lack of suitable applications, mostly due to the operational requirements of the 
services and the fact that candidates who followed the Academy-route, fell behind 
their peers career wise, especially in terms of rank promotion.58  This was of course 
not unique to South Africa.  In the Canadian forces, Haycock observes, ‘seeking 
higher education became a career punitive… and consequently many did not seek it 
at all’.59  It would certainly not be too difficult to find similar examples in other 
defence forces also. 
Post-Cold War And Post-Apartheid Developments 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980's and the consequent 
termination of the Cold War changed South Africa's security situation completely.  
The SADF and Cuban forces withdrew from Namibia and Angola, and Namibia 
became a sovereign state in March 1990.  Meanwhile, in February 1990, the 
National Party Government unbanned the ANC, PAC, SACP and other 
organisations associated with the liberation struggle in South Africa and embarked 
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upon an all-party political negotiation process that culminated in a new, democratic 
political dispensation in South Africa on 27 April 1994.  With these developments, 
both the internal and external threat linked with communist expansion for so long, 
disappeared.  As was the case immediately after the Second World War, South 
Africa found itself without a discernible military threat once again. 
 With the evaporation of the military threat during the final years of the old 
dispensation, the Military Academy by and large continued to respond to the 
functional needs of the former SADF.  The increasing focus on applying business 
principles to the military, particularly the emphasis on management rather than 
traditional military leadership, led to the renaming of the Commercial Sciences to 
Management Sciences and the conversion of Business Economics (Mil) to Military 
Management in 1991.  At the same time, however, General J.J. Geldenhuys, then 
Chief of the former SADF, emphasised the need for a core subject to form the basis 
of ‘military science’ and thus of all BMil degree courses.  He suggested that Military 
History should play that role, but his expectations with regard to the subject content 
was apparently of such a nature that it was decided to introduce a new, 
multidisciplinary subject, Military Strategy, as a compulsory subject for all degree 
courses instead.60  Comprising elements of, inter alia, political science, military 
history and military sociology,61 the subject Military Strategy revived the concept of 
a core curriculum to provide all Academy graduates, regardless of their study 
direction, with a broad understanding of warfare and the profession of arms.  
Though Military Strategy could hardly provide a comprehensive foundation for 
military science on its own, its institution as a compulsory subject was a step in the 
right direction, since it introduced students to a variety of possible threat scenarios. 
 South Africa’s transition to democracy on 27 April 1994 naturally brought 
about a complete transformation of the country’s defence function as well.  This 
included first and foremost the institution of civil control over the military and the 
integration of the former statutory and non-statutory forces62 into the new SANDF.  
It also encompassed the equally important issues of formulating a new, appropriate 
defence policy, restructuring and rightsizing the SANDF and implementing equal 
opportunity policies and affirmative action to make the SANDF representative of 
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South Africa’s demographic profile.63  These and other aspects of the transformation 
of South Africa’s defence found expression in the White Paper on Defence 
published in May 1996 and the subsequent Defence Review released in April 1998.64  
The White Paper asserted that ‘South Africa… is not confronted by an immediate 
conventional threat and does not anticipate external military aggression in the short 
to medium-term’.65  This post-apartheid threat perception set the stage for the 21st 
century and will be discussed under the next heading, together with the Military 
Academy’s response to it. 
 The absence of a direct military threat provided ‘considerable space to 
rationalise, redesign and rightsize’66 the SANDF, which had a positive impact on the 
enrolment of students at the Military Academy.  The curtailment of the Defence 
Force’s operational deployment created more time for officer development and re-
opened the opportunity to include the Military Academy in the loop once more.  At 
the same time, the complex and uncertain post-Cold War military environment 
impressed upon the military authorities the necessity to raise the educational level of 
the officers’ corps.  At the national level the advent of the new political dispensation 
certainly sensitised military leaders for the value of contextualised tertiary education 
in reconciling cultural differences in the longer term integration of the statutory and 
non-statutory military forces into a new, professional, representative SANDF.67 
 The process of increasing the student body at the Academy and making it 
representative of the South African population commenced before 1994.  The former 
SADF already put plans in place in 1990 to increase the total number of students at 
the Academy from approximately 200 to 450 by 1999.  At the same time it was 
realised that, with a view to the coming of a new, democratic South Africa, the issue 
was not only how many students were admitted to the Academy, but also who those 
students were.  For almost three decades the Academy had been an exclusively 
white, male institution.  Female (three) and so-called “coloured” (one) students were 
only admitted to the Military Academy as late as 1978 and 1979 respectively.  The 
admittance of female students, however, was suspended the very next year due to 
lack of suitable accommodation, while candidates from the "other population 
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groups" were never forthcoming in significant numbers. The dawning of the new 
political landscape brought the first concerted effort to make the student body more 
representative of the South African population.  Female students were readmitted in 
1991, and every effort was made to recruit more students from the Indian, black and 
so-called “coloured” communities.  The year 1991 saw the admittance of the first-
ever black students. 68 
 Though efforts to achieve the ideals of greater numbers and a representative 
student body were stepped up significantly from 1994, neither had been realised by 
the turn of the century.  After reaching an all-time high of 273 students in 1998, it 
dropped to 235 in 1999 and to 187 in 2000 due to a lack of suitable candidates.  By 
2000 historically-disadvantaged ethnic groups still comprised only a third of the 
student body, while female students also formed a third of the total.69  These facts 
seem to suggest that the military was not a preferred career path for young people, 
amongst other things perhaps because the new political dispensation opened up 
many other, more attractive, career opportunities for historically-disadvantaged 
groups. 
Meeting The Challenges Of The 21st Century 
 When the world famous air theorist and military writer, Air Vice-Marshal 
R.A. Mason, addressed the concluding session of the United States Air Force 
Academy's 17th Military History Symposium on 22 November 1996,70 he tabulated 
'ten features likely to influence the security environment' of the 21st Century from 
the US Air Force's perspective, namely:71 
• No direct threat to the national integrity of the United States; 
• A need for constant vigilance against the emergence of any future threat; 
• Continued concern for regional stability and U.S. interests worldwide; 
• Commitments will frequently be unpredictable; 
• Responsibilities will include "peacekeeping" and humanitarian operations; 
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• New dangers from terrorism and international crime, particularly narcotics; 
• An extended period of dwindling resources allocated to defence; 
• Most military operations will be exposed to international media, with an 
instant impact on public opinions and government policy; 
• The impact of technology; and 
• An unchallenged aerospace world supremacy of the US Air Force. 
 National and regional circumstances will certainly put its own stamp on 
Mason's list of 21st century security features, but they are in essence applicable 
universally.  The SANDF's likely deployment in the 21st century will probably be in 
connection with secondary, non-combat functions relating to internal law and order, 
illegal immigration, cross-border trafficking in drugs, stolen goods and small arms, 
civil disasters and regional peace-support operations.72  Referring to the 
aforementioned absence of a direct military threat against South African, the 1996 
White Paper observes that ‘the vast majority of (international) conflicts are taking 
place within rather than between, states’ and that such conflicts ‘arise from internal 
ethnic, religious and other divisions’.  The White Paper stresses that ‘such conflicts 
are increasingly regarded as regional and international concerns’73 and that South 
Africa’s security is therefore intimately intertwined with that of Sub-Saharan Africa 
and in particular Southern Africa.  South Africa will consequently ‘encourage the 
development of a multi-lateral ‘common security’ approach in Southern Africa’.74 
 Plagued by poverty, underdevelopment, internal conflict, environmental 
degradation and disease, much of Sub-Saharan Africa remains volatile and conflict 
has indeed escalated in the region since the end of the Cold War.  International 
borders do not contain conflict arising from these phenomena and there is always the 
possibility that regional conflicts could spill over to South Africa.75  Constant 
vigilance against the emergence of direct military threats is therefore not negotiable 
and the primary function of the SANDF will always be to defend South Africa 
against external military aggression.  From a common security perspective the 1996 
White Paper anticipates that ‘situations may arise in southern Africa where inter or 
                                                
72. Defence Review 1998, p 18; L.S. Mollo.  2003.  Exemplary leadership and exemplary teams:  
Unleashing future defence leadership.  Scientia Militaria, Vol 31, No 1, p 117;  M. Lekota.  
2003.  Opening Speech at Meeting of SADC Defence Ministers, 3 July.  African Armed 
Forces, July, p 20. 
73. White Paper on Defence 1996, p 12. 
74. White Paper on Defence 1996, p 13. 
75. M. Lekota.  2003.  Opening Speech at Meeting of SADC Defence Ministers, 3 July.  African 
Armed Forces, July, p 20. 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 32, Nr 1, 2004. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
 80
intra-state conflict poses a threat to peace and stability in the region as a whole… 
[and] it may become necessary to deploy the SANDF in multi-national peace 
support operations’ on the subcontinent.76  After all, the post-Cold War international 
community is displaying increasing ambivalence towards conflict resolution in 
Africa and has made it clear that African states will be required to take care of their 
own peacekeeping needs.77  To that end South Africa has already demonstrated her 
commitment to take up the burden by deploying the SANDF to Lesotho, Burundi 
and the DRC on peace support missions. 
 Regional security, peace and stability also take a high priority on South 
Africa's defence agenda, with a view to the Republic's perceived leadership role in 
the African Renaissance.  As E.A. Thorne points out: 
As is plain for all to see, progress towards the… African Renaissance will 
often be halting and there will be reverses.  It is in such circumstances that 
the more democratically advanced African states may well have to 
militarily intervene or dispatch peacekeepers and peacemakers to restore 
order or to create the conditions for a new beginning.78 
 South Africa is widely regarded as 'the one state able to ensure effective 
peacekeeping on the African continent'79 and is consequently expected to play a 
leading role in that regard.  Much of this is, however, expected to take place within 
collective structures.  At a meeting in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, in May 
2003 the African Chiefs of Staff laid the foundation for the creation of an African 
Standby Force (ASF) to fulfil this regional policing role.80  Briefing Parliament on 
these developments in June 2003, South African Defence Minister, Mosiuoa Lekota, 
said that agreement had already been reached on issues such as 
doctrine and posture, shifts in the nature of peacekeeping operations, 
interoperability of forces, common standards of training, equipment and 
logistics, standard procurement regimes for commonly identified 
appropriate equipment needs, the establishment of command structures 
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and so on… The SANDF will have to align itself more coherently with 
these new developments.81 
 It is very clear from the above-mentioned scenario that SANDF officers will 
be operating in a very complex socio-political milieu in the 21st century, both 
nationally and regionally.  Mason’s observation on the challenges facing US Air 
Force officers in the 21st Century is equally true of South African officers: 
Junior officers will be exposed suddenly and frequently to widely differing 
cultures and regions.  They may carry much greater personal 
responsibility; to the point of individually enhancing or damaging national 
credibility because of the constant interaction between operations, media 
coverage, and public and international opinion.82 
 It is thus imperative that SANDF officers should know and understand the 
societies (foreign and domestic) in which they operate or may be required to operate, 
their role in those societies and the possible repercussions of their actions.  The 
Canadian Defence Force discovered the need for such knowledge the hard way a 
decade ago.  On 16 March 1993, while on a peacekeeping mission in Somalia, a 
master corporal and a private soldier of the Canadian Airborne Regiment brutally 
beat a detained Somalian teenager to death.  The official Canadian enquiry 
'stipulated leadership failure as the overriding factor underlying the conduct 
associated with the incident'.83  The Commission of Enquiry investigating this 
incident found that 'the problems went far deeper than the events in Somalia, and 
they involved the fundamental issues of shortcomings in military leadership and 
ethics, and thereby education.'84  Investigations into Canadian officer education 
revealed that in sharp contrast to the US forces who normally required a master's 
degree for promotion beyond the rank of Major, only about 50% of Canadian 
officers had a university education at all and that: 
what focus on higher education has existed, is primarily in the technical 
fields, especially those with immediate, practical applications.  There has 
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been little apparent official emphasis on liberal education or in the 
humanities and social sciences.85 
Retired Canadian General Ramsey Withers in 1998 concluded that: 
Officer trainees need a fairly comprehensive introduction to the profession 
of arms and its component parts.  In post industrial, liberal democracies 
this introduction includes extensive studies of the humanities and solid 
grounding in the sciences.  In addition, the study of military theory and 
military history is mandatory.86 
 The end result of the investigations into Canadian officer education was that 
the Canadian Defence Minister made a university degree compulsory for all officers 
in 1997.87  At the same time a core programme, common to all cadets at the Royal 
Military College (RMC), Kingston, Canada, had to be introduced: 
The core was to include courses in military history, civics, military law, 
Canadian military history, military theory and strategy, international 
relations, leadership and ethics, information technology, and emerging 
technologies. Mathematics and science subjects were to be well 
represented. The traditional degrees would continue in Engineering, 
Science and the Arts, but the core courses would constitute 30% of the 
courses taken in any degree pattern by all cadets.88 
 The idea of a broad core curriculum is neither unique to the RMC in Canada, 
nor new.  To state but one example, all US service academies have had core 
curricula based in both the natural and human or social sciences throughout their 
existence.  In the case of West Point, all cadets must complete a core curriculum of 
31 courses, regardless of their academic majors.  The natural sciences component 
comprises four semesters of mathematics, two of physics, two of chemistry, one of 
terrain analysis, one of computer science and five from one of seven engineering 
sequences.  The human and social sciences component comprises four semesters of 
history (including American, world and military history), three of social sciences, 
three of English, two of behavioural sciences, one of philosophy, two of a foreign 
language, and one of constitutional law.  All of these are aimed at ensuring that US 
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officers are able to operate in the complex and rapidly changing technological and 
socio-political environments of the contemporary world.89 
 The question, against this background, is how relevant the current academic 
offerings of the Military Academy are to the 21st Century educational needs of the 
SANDF in terms of the national threat perception and the associated role scenario of 
the SANDF?  The Military Academy has indeed effected a fundamental 
restructuring of its academic menu to meet the perceived future educational needs of 
the SANDF.  In 2001, after consultation with representatives of the various services 
and branches of the Defence Force, the Academy replaced its traditional degree 
courses in the Human, Management (Commercial) and Natural Sciences with six 
outcomes-based academic programmes designed in accordance with the 
transformation of higher education in South Africa.  These are: 
• a Programme in Technology; 
• a Programme Technology and Management; 
• a Programme in War, Environment and Technology; 
• a Programme in Organisational and Resource Management; 
• a Programme in Human and Organisational Development; and 
• a Programme in Security and Africa Studies. 
 The Programme in Technology, aimed at the development of military 
officers’ technological knowledge and competence relating to their specific arm of 
service, retained a natural science focus with the exception of compulsory courses in 
System Management for the third years and English Studies (Mil), for the first years.  
The Programme in Technology and Management, geared towards the combat branch 
officer, combines subjects such as Physics (Mil), Nautical Science, Aeronautics and 
Military Geography with Military Management, Economics (Mil), Accountancy 
(Mil) and Industrial Psychology (Mil).  The Programme in War, Environment and 
Technology, destined to orientate combat officers in and sensitise/prepare them for 
the technological, physical, strategic and historical environment in which the 
military operates, includes a more equal combination of natural and social science 
subjects such as Military History, Industrial Psychology (Mil) and Political Science 
(Mil).  The Programme in Organisational and Resource Management caters chiefly 
for support branch officers who require skills and competencies in the broader 
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managerial sciences, aimed at effective, efficient, economical and transparent use of 
the financial and other resources within their area of responsibility.  The main 
subjects incorporated into this programme are Military Management, Public 
Development Management (Mil), Economics (Mil) and Management Accounting 
(Mil).90 
 Two programmes are based primarily in the social sciences.  The Security 
and Africa Studies Programme is geared to sensitise both combat and support 
officers to the historical, political, strategic, socio-economic and 
physical/geographical milieu in which the military operates. The main subjects 
included in this programme are Military History, Military Strategy and Political 
Science (Mil).  The Programme in Human and Organisational Development serves 
to equip officers with skills and competencies to function effectively in the fields of 
human and organisational development and has Industrial Psychology (Mil), 
Military Management and Public Development Management (Mil) as its core 
subjects.91 
 As was the case with the former degree courses, these new, career-orientated 
programmes are ‘tailor-made’ for the more functional academic needs of the 
services and their various branches.  The combination of subjects that students are 
permitted to follow in these programmes consequently depends first and foremost on 
their service and mustering, though personal preference also plays a small role.92  
Though some of these programmes overlap in certain subjects, the two skills-based 
subjects, Computer Skills (Mil) and English Studies (Mil)93 are the only subjects 
shared by all these programmes.  There is thus, contrary to the international trend, no 
core curriculum that equips all Academy students with the basic technological and, 
especially, the socio-political knowledge required to orientate them in the complex 
environment of the 21st century, particularly with a view to their expected peace 
support role in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Furthermore, the structuring of these 
programmes was handicapped to some extent by the fact that budgetary constraints 
ruled out the possibility of introducing a new subject such as Military Sociology, 
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which could be extremely useful in helping officers to understand the nature of 
social change and how this impacts on the military profession.94 
 Besides the restructuring of academic programmes, the turn of the century 
also saw a renewed effort, mostly by the Military Academy itself, to route more 
officers and prospective officers through the Military Academy.  This was not only 
to enhance the educational level of the officers’ corps, but also to ensure the future 
of the Academy by making it ‘indispensable’ to the SANDF.  A new bridging 
programme of six months duration, known as the Preparatory Certificate in Military 
Studies, was introduced in 2000 to offer an alternative admission route to 
candidates, especially those coming from a disadvantaged educational background, 
who had the required potential for higher education but did not comply with 
university prerequisites.  In addition, this programme also offers candidates who do 
comply with the prerequisites, but are regarded as students at risk the opportunity to 
improve their learning skills before embarking on a degree programme.95 
 Following this innovative step, the Academy introduced a one year 
Certificate in Military Studies in the technology related programmes for the pupil 
pilots of the South African Air Force in 2001.96  The Certificate in Military Studies 
was subsequently extended to the other services when the SANDF decided in 2002 
to route all its prospective officers through the Academy by means of a newly 
designed Military Skills Development System (MSDS).  This system was introduced 
to serve as primary source of personnel supply to both the permanent and the reserve 
forces, offering a voluntary two year service contract to selected school-leavers.  
Those earmarked for commissioned appointments after their first year of training, 
follow the Certificate in Military Studies at the Academy during their second year.  
A number of those who pass the certificate programme may, according to the needs 
of the services, be selected for extended contracts in the regular forces, while the rest 
may be offered five-year contracts in the part-time forces.  Unsuccessful candidates 
may be offered contracts as non-commissioned officers in either the regular of the 
part-time forces.  A selected number of those candidates who are offered extended 
contracts in the regular forces may be allowed to carry on with degree programmes 
at the Academy in accordance with the needs of the services.97 
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 In 2004 the Certificate in Military Studies displaced the Preparatory 
Certificate in Military Studies completely.  The former coincides with the first year 
of the various degree programmes, but also includes a military development 
component.  The academic component of the various certificate programmes differs 
from the first year of the corresponding degree programmes only in that it requires 
fewer credits than the latter. 
 In addition to these non-degree programmes, a distance education 
programme (e-learning) was introduced at the Academy with effect from 2003.  This 
initiative took the Academy’s degree programmes not only to officers who are 
unable to study at the Academy on a residential basis, but also to all other members 
of the Department of Defence (DoD), including non-commissioned officers, private 
soldiers, civilians and members of the part-time forces.  Furthermore, steps have 
been taken for the introduction of an MPhil programme in Security Management to 
be linked with the Executive National Security Programme for senior officers at the 
SA National Defence College.98 
 These new developments have increased the student body of the Military 
Academy significantly.  The current (2004) residential undergraduate students 
number only 136, but this number is augmented by 149 MSDS students, 55 distance 
education students and 60 postgraduate students (honours and master’s level), 
bringing the total to 400.99  In terms of racial representivity, the residential, 
undergraduate student body almost meets the target of 64,68% blacks, 24,35% 
whites, 10,22% coloureds and 0,75% Indians set for the DoD as a whole in the 1998 
Defence Review,100 as it comprises 56,84% blacks, 28,07% whites, 13,68% 
coloureds and 1,40% Indians.  At postgraduate level the student body is still far off 
target as it consists of 21,51% blacks, 55,74% whites, 14,75% coloureds and no 
Indians.101  The undergraduate distance education students also fall short of the 
target as they comprise 41,51% blacks, 28,30% whites, 28,30% coloureds and 
1,89% Indians.102  While the 1998 Defence Review sets no definite target for gender 
representivity, the student population of the Military Academy certainly does not 
reflect the fact that females form about 51% of South Africa’s total population.  The 
residential, undergraduate student body comprises 78,88% male and 21,12% female 
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students, while 67,21% of the postgraduate students are male and 32,79% female.103  
Amongst the undergraduate distance education students the male-female ratio is 
79,25% to 20,75%.104  Whatever shortcomings remain, the Academy has certainly 
made significant progress since the early 1990s towards exposing a greater 
percentage of officers to tertiary education and meeting representivity targets. 
Conclusion 
 The threat perception of a nation is an important guideline for officer 
education, since it defines or anticipates the military and socio-political milieu in 
which its officers must be prepared to operate.  The direction taken from the threat 
perception must, however, be set against the fundamental principles of officer 
education, such as providing officers with a broad professional frame of reference 
and sound analytical, decision-making skills imparted through a broad, liberal 
education.  The national threat perception merely provides a particular focus within 
that sphere. 
 The South African Military Academy has historically by and large failed to 
satisfy the requirements of the national threat perception.  Firstly, the military 
authorities, contrary to international trends, have never located tertiary education at 
the heart of officer development, with the result that only a small percentage of the 
officer’s corps was routed through the Military Academy.  Secondly, the Academy, 
for most of its existence, lacked an appropriate core curriculum, compulsory to all 
students, to prepare them for the milieu defined by the threat perception.  Academy 
students followed diverging curricula defined by the functional needs of the services 
and individual preference.  The exception was the 1950s when all students had to 
take Military Science, comprising Military History, Military Law, Military 
Geography and Military Technology, and the 1970s when Military History and 
Political Science were compulsory for all students.  However imperfect these core 
curricula may have been, they did provide a common perspective on the profession 
of arms and an understanding of the milieu in which South African officers were 
required to operate in terms of the national threat perception.  At the height of the 
former SADF’s counterinsurgency war there was no social sciences based core 
curriculum to prepare all Academy students for the complexities of revolutionary 
and counterrevolutionary warfare; that benefit was restricted to those few that 
followed the BMil course in the Human Sciences.  The same situation prevailed at 
the birth of the SANDF in 1994, when there was no core curriculum to create an 
understanding of the new socio-political landscape and the societal forces at work in 
the integration and transformation of the SANDF. 
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 The new academic programmes instituted at the Academy in 2001 
perpetuated the shortcomings of the past.  Most of these programmes still address 
the functional needs of the various services only.  They do not fully meet the 
requirements of South Africa’s current threat perception, neither it in terms of 
preparedness to meet a direct military threat that might materialise unexpectedly, nor 
in terms of the secondary, essentially non-combatant, functions of the SANDF 
associated with its role in regional peace and security.  The SANDF's perceived role 
in the new millennium as guardian of South Africa’s national integrity, protector of 
the new democracy and peace supporter on the African continent, demands an 
institutionalised knowledge of the dynamics of the socio-political milieu within 
which its officers operate, but also keep pace with advances in weapons technology.  
This necessitates a rethinking of the Military Academy's academic programmes to 
create a core curriculum for all officers that satisfies these needs.  This might require 
spreading the BMil programmes over four years, as is the custom at several military 
institutions abroad. 
 Furthermore, there could be little doubt that the complex technological and 
socio-political operational milieu that the SANDF faces in the 21st century makes 
university education imperative for all its future officers.  Passing a portion of new 
officers through the Certificate in Military Studies by means of the MSDS is a useful 
short term tool, but a plan must be devised to route as many young officers as 
possible through the Military Academy’s degree programmes and to educate the rest 
at civilian universities, as is the trend internationally.  All this will put more pressure 
on the declining defence budget, but a meagre saving now, might well result in 
blood and agony later, especially when young officers are deployed on widely 
diverse peace support missions in the complex politico-military milieu on the 
African continent. 
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